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Due to high volatility and environmental mobility,
radioactive isotopes of iodine pose a serious risk
in the acute phases of a nuclear accident. The
critical organ for iodine is the thyroid. A number of
studies dealing with thyroid protection from
exposure to radioiodine have shown that
radioiodine uptake by the thyroid can be
effectively blocked by administration of stable
iodine, usually in the form of potassium iodide (KI)
pills. However, unless perfectly timed, this
protective action may be counterproductive. The
International Atomic Energy Agency recommends
potassium iodide prophylaxis in cases when an
avertable thyroid dose by protective action
exceeds 100 mGy. This paper reviews
experiences and practices with potassium iodide
in the thyroid protection. This kind of information
should serve as the basis for discussion and
decision making on KI prophylactic programmes
in nuclear emergency situations in Croatia. If
Croatia adopts such programme, it will still have
to develop the most effective way of KI stockpiling
and distribution or predistribution.
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Iodine is a highly volatile element, which makes it very mobile in the environment. It
is unevenly distributed in nature, as it is present in the litosphere approximately 5
times as much as in the ocean waters. Of at least 25 iodine isotopes with mass
numbers ranging from 117 to 141, all except 127I are radioactive (1, 2). From the
point of view of environmental contamination, and resulting doses to man, the most
important isotopes of iodine are 131I and 129I. They are the only radioactive isotopes
of iodine produced by fission with half-lives longer than one day. 131I is a beta emitter
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with half-life of 8.06 days and maximum beta energy of 0.81 MeV. It emits gamma
rays of 0.36 and 0.64 MeV and some other energies. 129I has a very long half-life
(1.57 × 107 years). It is also a beta emitter with maximum energy of 0.15 MeV and
accompanying gamma ray of 0.09 MeV in 8% of its disintegrations. Like any other
fission products, the two radionuclides are released into the environment through
spontaneous fission of natural uranium. The main source of 131I and 129I, however, are
nuclear explosions, releases from nuclear reactors, and nuclear fuel waste reprocess-
ing plants. In the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) type of nuclear power plants, the
equilibrium activity of 131I is established after a few weeks of irradiation of uranium fuel
in a nuclear reactor at a value of 3 × 1015 Bq per MW(e) (1). This value slightly in-
creases with the burn-up of nuclear fuel reaching the end of the fuel cyclus as a result
of a larger fission yield of plutonium, which also contributes to the build-up of 131I
activity concentrations. The activity of 129I produced in a nuclear reactor is much
lower than that of 131I, as the inventory of 129I after three years of fuel irradiation is
1.5 × 108 Bq per MW(e). In case of a severe accident in a PWR nuclear power plant,
the conservative assessment is that 95% of noble gasses (Xe and Kr) contained in the
core, 25–35% of iodine and caesium, and up to 10% of other activation and fission
products, including 90Sr, would be released into the environment. In the acute phase
of a major nuclear accident, the plume (cloud-like formation) of radioactive material
that might be released in the environment primarily consists of the radioactive iso-
topes of iodine, especially 131I and noble gases due to their high volatility.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Iodine enters the metabolism of living organisms and selectively targets the thyroid
gland. According to a simple, three-compartment model adopted by the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), 30% of iodine entering the body transfer
compartment is translocated to the thyroid, while the remainder is directly excreted
(3). Iodine in the thyroid is believed to have a biological half-life of 120 days, which
is, luckily, about 15 times the radiological half-life of 131I. The biological half-life of
iodine in all other organs is 12 days (3). However, the effective half-life of iodine in a
thyroid (time for the thyroid to obtain one-half of its maximum burden during chronic
exposure) was estimated to be 7.6 days (4). Therefore, in case of a severe nuclear
accident, it is essential to protect general population from the exposure to the plume.
The principal types of exposure are:
a) whole body external exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and from
deposited material; and
b) inhalation exposure to a passing radioactive plume. The duration of exposure
could range from half an hour to several days.
Shelter and/or evacuation are likely to be the principal immediate protection
from exposure to the plume. It is desirable that the area around the facility on which
the accident happened initially be evacuated beyond the perimeter of about 3 to 10
kilometres, preferably in the general downwind direction. Iodine prophylaxis, that is,
immediate administration of the thyroid blocking agent (usually potassium iodide),
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should be considered as the next step. One of the central issues in the emergency
planning is to determine whether and at what projected thyroid radiation dose should
stable iodine be given to the population (5).
In the process of establishing an international consensus on generic intervention
levels (GILs) for urgent long-term protective measures, the International Atomic Ener-
gy Agency (IAEA) convened a number of technical meetings, which resulted in the
Intervention Criteria in a Nuclear or Radiation Emergency (6). This safety guide rep-
resents the international consensus on values which subsequently became the basis
for intervention guidance in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection
against Ionising Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation Sources (BSS) (7) jointly
issued by the IAEA, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Inter-
national Labour Organization, Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development, Pan American Health Organization, and World
Health Organization. Table 1 shows the optimized generic intervention levels for ur-
gent protective measures implemented in the BSS.
Table 1 Recommended generic intervention levels for urgent protective measures
Protective action Generic intervention levels Avertable dose
(dose avertable by protective action)* period
Sheltering 10 mSv 2 days
Evacuation 50 mSv** <1 week
Iodine prophylaxis 100 mGy any
*Dose to be saved by protective action, that is, the difference between the dose to be expected with the protective action and
the dose to be expected without it.
**In some countries a value of 100 mSv of avertable dose is considered to be more realistic for temporary evacuation. ICRP
has recommended that evacuation would be justified for an avertable dose of 500 mSv (8, 9).
The values from the above table meet the following three basic principles:
1. serious deterministic health effects of ionising radiation should be avoided.
2. intervention should be justified in the sense that introduction of the protective
measures should achieve more benefit than harm.
3. levels at which the intervention is introduced and at which it is later withdrawn
should be optimized, so that the protective measure will produce maximum benefit.
The limit irradiation level above which iodine prophylaxis should be applied has
been set to 100 mGy of avertable committed dose to a thyroid which was considered
to be the optimal intervention level. The setting of GILs has taken into account price
and cost of equipment and human labour in implementation of particular protective
action, costs of insurance and reinsurance, and the consequences of social disrup-
tions caused either by implementation or non-implementation of a particular protec-
tive action. The prophylaxis is implemented by administering or taking pills of potas-
sium iodide (KI) which is a well known blocker of radioiodine uptake by thyroid gland
(10–13). KI saturates the thyroid with stable iodine. Potassium iodide is an oral anti-
thyroid agent used as an adjunct to other antithyroid agents in the treatment of
hyperthyroidism, thyrotoxicosis. KI is also used preoperatively to induce thyroid invo-
lution. The drug has demonstrated high efficiency in treating cutaneous sporotricho-
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sis. However, administration of KI as a protectant of the thyroid gland from exposure
to radioactive isotopes of iodine raises the questions of appropriate timing, as well as
of possible side effects (14–17).
CONTRAINDICATIONS TO POTASSIUM IODIDE
One may wish to note that literature speaks little about quantitative aspects of ad-
verse reactions to potassium iodide. This is due to small study groups, selection bias,
or limited follow-up (14). Recently, however, some data became available even on-
line, that is, via Internet (18). Potassium iodide was officially approved by the Amer-
ican Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 1939 (16). The FDA has evaluated the
medical and radiological risk of administering KI for thyroid blocking under nuclear
emergency conditions, and has approved the over-the-counter sale of the drug for
this purpose.
The Mechanism of Action: Potassium iodide inhibits the thyroid hormone syn-
thesis and release in the thyroid gland. Consequently, the thyroid gland vascularity is
reduced, its tissue becomes firmer, the thyroid cell diminishes, the follicular colloid
reaccumulates, and the bound iodine levels increase. As a post-irradiation protectant,
KI blocks the uptake of radioactive iodine isotopes by the thyroid gland and minimis-
es the risk of radiation-induced thyroid neoplasms. In treating sporotrichosis, KI en-
hances the tissue response to infection.
Pharmacokinetics: Potassium iodide is administered orally and is absorbed from
the gastrointestinal tract as iodinated amino acids. It demonstrates significant extra-
cellular distribution, with most of the drug accumulating in the thyroid gland. Potas-
sium iodide distributes into breast milk and crosses the placenta in amounts sufficient
to cause foetal harm. Therapeutic effects of KI are usually visible within 24 hours
upon administration, with maximum efficiency occurring on days 10–15 of therapy.
Potassium iodide is excreted renally.
Pregnancy: Potassium iodide crosses the placenta in amounts sufficient to cause
foetal goiter and/or hypothyroidism. Although its prolonged use during pregnancy is
not advised, potassium iodide was used in short terms (10 days) in the treatment of
labor-induced thyrotoxic crisis and in treatment prior to thyroidectomy in pregnant
women. As potassium iodide is excreted into the breast milk, rash or thyroid suppres-
sion can occur in the nursing infant. However, the American Academy of Pediatrics
does not consider breast-feeding as contraindication.
Patients with sulphite hypersensitivity and/or asthma should use potassium io-
dide with caution because some formulations of this drug contain sodium bisulphite.
Asthmatic patients are more sensitive to it than the nonasthmatic patients. Potassium
iodide is contraindicated for patients with acute bronchitis.
Cautious administration or application of potassium iodide should also be true
for patients with renal dysfunction. The impaired renal filtering of electrolytes may
lead to an increase in serum potassium. Potassium iodide can also exacerbate hyper-
kalemia or myotonia congenita (Thomsen’s disease). Those patients should be mon-
itored for serum potassium and signs or symptoms of potassium toxicity. Further-
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more, extreme caution is advisable in the following conditions: acute dehydration,
heat cramps, adrenal insufficiency, and cardiac disease. Caution is advisable to pa-
tients with acne vulgari, as halogens in general can produce an acneiform rash or
aggravate existing acne.
Extreme caution is advised to patients with tuberculosis, because potassium io-
dide may cause pulmonary irritation and increased secretion. In fact, patients with
tubercolosis should avoid potassium iodide treatment if at all possible.
It is well known that chronic ingestion of iodine or iodine-generating compounds
in amounts surpassing daily requirements for hormone biosynthesis ten or more
times may lead to iodide goiter in certain subjects (11). This is why patients with
iodine hypersensitivity should use potassium iodide with extreme caution. The risk
group includes patients with hypocomplementemic vasculitis, goiter, or autoimmune
thyroid disease.
There have been reports that the administration of stable iodine in the prophy-
lactic treatment of endemic goiter is associated with an increased incidence of pap-
illary carcinoma (19), although it was not possible to quantify any stable iodine car-
cinogenic potential, especially after the additional effect of radiation exposure (6).
Nevertheless, this potential warns against selecting intervention levels of only a few
mGy. After all, this is one of the reasons why the recommended generic intervention
level for iodine prophylaxis has been established at 100 mGy (Table 1).
Intrathyroidal and extrathyroidal side effects that occurred after administering a
single dose of KI were discussed in detail by Nauman and Wolf (14) in a study on
effects of iodine prophylaxis in Poland after the Chernobyl accident. There were no
serious adverse reactions in the population of approximately 18 million people who
were given KI, except for two adults with known iodide sensitivity. The severe reac-
tions to KI of the two individuals serve as a warning that such patients must be
identified and educated about their sensitivity and excluded from the prophylactic
programmes.
EFFICIENCY OF POTASSIUM IODIDE AND DOSAGE
The efficiency of KI in protecting the thyroid gland, that is, in blocking the uptake of
radioiodine, strongly depends on the time of intake relative to the start of exposure to
radioactive iodine. Based on the study performed by Il’in and co-workers (10), the
findings of which have been adopted by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission (NRC) (20), the best results are obtained if KI is taken 1–2 hours before or
immediately after the start of exposure. Taking the recommended dose of KI just
before or at the time of exposure can block over 90% of the radioactive iodine uptake
by the thyroid (Figure 1). When taken approximately 3–4 hours after the start of the
acute exposure, KI is able to block about 50% of the uptake. Once radioactive iodine
has concentrated in the thyroid, KI starts to block its excretion. The KI dosage rec-
ommended by the FDA is 130 mg/day (which contains 100 mg of stable iodine) for
adults and children above one year and 65 mg/day for children below one year of age
(20). The duration of protection is, like the extent of protection, dose-related. That is,
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even a large single dose will not protect for much longer than approximately 36 hours
(14). Therefore, KI should be administered for at least three consecutive days after
the acute exposure to prevent accumulation of radioiodine excreted from other body
compartments in the thyroid gland.
IODINE PROPHYLAXIS IN POLAND AFTER THE CHERNOBYL
ACCIDENT
The largest epidemiological study on the effects of KI prophylaxis ever performed was
the one in Poland after the Chernobyl accident. The accident at the Chernobyl nucle-
ar power plant in Ukraine took place on April 26, 1986. Two explosions that occurred,
the steam explosion followed by the explosion of hydrogen, expelled fission products,
as well as some material from fuel elements to the exterior. Because of the ignited
graphite moderator, the release was prolonged and elevated. Consequently, volatile
radioactive material was accumulated in a cloud reaching the height up to seven km.
It was estimated that 1.3 × 1018 Bq of 131I (i.e., 20% of the 131I core inventory) has
been released (21). The increased air radioactivity was first detected in Poland on April
27. The spectra showed that 80% of the total radioactivity were iodine isotopes (14).
On April 29 at noon, the Polish Minister of Health ordered the centralized pharmacy
to prepar KI solutions for distribution in 11 most affected provinces. The KI doses
were prepared according to the following protocol:
a) 15 mg for newborns,
b) 50 mg for children five years or under,
c) 70 mg for all others,
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d) Because the cancer risk for adults was believed to be low, and some side-
effects might be anticipated, iodine prophylaxis was not recommended to adults.
e) Iodine prophylaxis was recommended to lactating women, but was not man-
datory.
Stable iodine was given as a single dose of KI solution to 10.5 million children
and seven million adults. Children showed no serious side effects, whereas only two
adults (with previous history of iodine sensitivity) had severe respiratory distresses.
However, side effects of KI other than those related to the thyroid were more frequent
than expected. Vomiting was the most common, followed by a few cases of diarrhea,
whereas both children and adults complained of gastric disturbances. It remained
unclear to what extent all these could be related to the administered iodide. The
control values for the side-effects, which could have been obtained from the popula-
tion not receiving KI, are not available. This is why one can hardly be as certain as to
associate the side effects with KI treatment rather than with panic. The Polish expe-
rience showed that rapid response to widespread nuclear accidents is as much a
social issue as a medical or scientific one, and that it requires rapid organization of
large numbers of people and facilities.
IODINE PROPHYLAXIS PRACTICE IN THE USA
In the USA, which counts the most operating nuclear power plants, the issue of
stockpiling KI pills for prophylaxis of general public in the event of a nuclear reactor
accident is still open, although it is generally accepted that KI is an effective thyroid-
blocking agent. The cost of KI is not prohibitive since a 130 mg tablet costs US $
0.07. Therefore, supplying with KI pills to all residents within the 8 km perimeter (i.e.,
within the emergency planning zone) of one of the United States’ 107 operating
nuclear reactors would cost about US $ 200,000 (this figure should be added to
distribution and disposal cost). Furthermore, the safety of the drug is not disputed.
However, there is a major dilemma whether having KI at hand would make some
residents trust their fate to a pill rather than to evacuation. Namely, many federal
states, as well as the nuclear industry, believe that evacuation should be given priority
in a nuclear emergency. Potassium iodide would »create a false sense of security as
well as ’ambiguity’ through choice« (22). It has been left to states or local govern-
ments to decide which course to take (23).
The high incidence of thyroid cancer in Belarus and Ukraine in children exposed
to radiation following the Chernobyl nuclear plant acciolent in 1986 (24) has caused
many physicians and public health officials in the USA and other countries to recon-
sider the urgency of making KI readily available to the public. Consequently, support-
ers of stockpiling contend that it would be negligent of the nuclear industry and of
state and federal governments not to endorse what they call »a simple and cheap
insurance policy«. For example, the American Thyroid Association, through its Public
Health Committee, has strongly recommended the stockpiling of KI for prophylaxis in
the event of a nuclear reactor accident (25).
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In the summer of 1998, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decided that
it would financially support those federal states which decide to stockpile KI pills.
Previously, NRC recommended that potassium iodide be available mainly for emer-
gency personnel, but not stored for general public. The US Department of Health and
Human Services has been preparing guidance on the potassium iodide issue which
will be considered by NRC and Federal Emergency Management Agency (26).
KI AND EMERGENCY PERSONNEL
In the acute phase of a nuclear accident, the information provided by emergency
response mobile units is essential to estimate the dose of KI for general public (27,
28). Even in countries which are excellently covered with fixed telemetric monitoring
stations, mobile units capable of transferring external dose-rate data and locality data
in real time are useful for mapping radiation levels in locations not covered with fixed
monitoring network (29). A primary function of a mobile unit team is to locate the
plume and assess its magnitude. In order to minimize the risk of a mobile unit
personnel exposed to radiation, it is necessary to survey as many locations as possi-
ble in as little time as possible. The maximum protection involves readily available
respirators and KI pills. According to criteria established in several USA plants respi-
rators are to be used at the radioactivity level of approximately 37 Bqm–3, whereas
criteria for administering KI pills vary between 0.1 Bqm–3 and 0.25 Bqm–3 (30). Prin-
ciples for protection of workers of different categories potentially exposed to radiation
in a nuclear emergency are given and discussed in full details elsewhere (6, 7).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A number of studies have shown that radioiodine uptake by thyroid gland can be
effectively blocked by administration of potassium iodide, provided that it occurs
within a few hours before or after the exposure to iodine radioisotopes has started.
Therefore, KI prophylactic programmes are an important part of nuclear emergency
preparedness. This is particularly true for the highly populated areas which, for a
number of reasons, cannot be effectively evacuated in a short time. One may wish to
note that in 1989 the World Health Organization recommended preventive distribu-
tion of KI. By now, the recommendation has been widely implemented by France and
Switzerland.
However, all individuals with iodide sensitivity have to be identified in order to
prevent serious iodine-related side effects. That can be achieved through a public
health care system.
In some countries it is recommended to stockpile KI in households. Stockpiling
should not, however, occur before general public is well informed about the principles
of emergency preparedness.
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Like many other countries, the Republic of Croatia can accomplish that through
national TV and radio network, teletext pages, and so on. It would also be useful to
establish an »emergency preparedness information server« on the Internet. This can
combine with real-time information about background radiation on several locations
in Croatia which is already available (31). In adopting KI prophylactic programmes,
competent Croatian authorities should be able to effectively resolve the issue of KI
stockpiling and distribution or predistribution. Such solutions should then reflect in
emergency plans giving detailed instructions on KI stockpiling and distribution proce-
dures in nuclear emergencies.
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Sa‘etak
PROFILAKSA KALIJEVIM JODIDOM I NUKLEARNE NESRE]E
Zbog velike hlapljivosti, te stoga potencijalno vrlo brzog {irenja kroz okoli{, u akutnoj fazi nesre}e nekog
nuklearnog postrojenja primarnu opasnost glede izlaganja radioaktivnom oblaku zna~e radioaktivni izotopi joda.
Kriti~an organ za jod je {titnja~a. Brojna istra`ivanja o za{titi {titnja~e od kontaminacije radioaktivnim izotopima
joda suglasna su da je u~inkoviti na~in za{tite {titnja~e unos stabilnog joda u organizam, obi~no u obliku tableta
kalijeva jodida (KI). No, ta za{titna mjera mora biti pravodobno provedena, ina~e ima suprotne u~inke. Preporuka
Me|unarodne agencije za atomsku energiju jest da se profilaksi kalijevim jodidom pristupa ako se procijeni da bi
doza koju {titnja~a primi zbog izlaganja radioaktivnim izotopima joda mogla prema{iti 100 mGy. U radu je dan
pregled dosada{njih spoznaja o u~inkovitosti za{tite {titnja~e kalijevim jodidom. Ove su pak informacije potrebne
za iniciranje rasprave i dono{enje odluke o programu KI profilakse u Hrvatskoj u slu~aju kriznoga stanja glede
nuklearne sigurnosti. Ako Hrvatska prihvati takav program, potrebno je razviti naju~inkovitiji na~in uskladi{tenja,
raspodjele ili preventivne raspodjele KI.
Klju~ne rije~i:
131I, pripravnost u kriznim stanjima, {titnja~a, unos stabilnog joda
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